The Sixth IEEE International Conference on Trust, Privacy and Security in Intelligent Systems, and Applications (TPS-ISA), 2024


Digital Evidence Chain of Custody: Navigating New Realities of Digital Forensics

Souradip Nath, Keb Summers, Jaejong Baek, and Gail-Joon Ahn





Motivation



Arrest of the BTK killer, 2005




Boston Marathon Bombing, 2013



College Admission Scandal, 2019

Motivation







FEBRUARY 8, 2017 · 9:06 AM

Criminal Conviction Overto Failure to Authenticate Soc Media Evidence



Boston Marathon Bombing, 2013

More Legal Lessons Learned: 7 Times Social Media Evidence Was Denied in Court

Digital content (like web pages, Facebook posts, and tweets) is increasingly being submitted as evidence during legal matters—but it isn't always being admitted by courts. As with any other form of evidence, digital evidence needs to meet a certain standard in order to be deemed admissible—and in many cases this comes down to how the evidence was collected and authenticated. If the collection and authentication process wasn't handled correctly—and the method employed didn't prove authenticity beyond any reasonable doubt—the evidence typically would not be accepted.

e-Discovery



College Admission Scandal, 2019

Digital Evidence Admissibility

Authenticity

- The digital evidence must be proven to originate from a credible source and not fabricated
- E.g., An email presented in court must be shown to have come from the defendant's verified account, confirming it as genuine evidence, and not maliciously fabricated.

Integrity

- The digital evidence must remain unaltered from the time it was collected until it is presented in court
- E.g., A screenshot of a social media post must be preserved in its original form, with metadata intact, to ensure it has not been edited before being used as evidence in court.

What is a Chain of Custody (CoC)?

A chronological history of the evidence throughout the life cycle of the case from its collection to presentation in the court.

The documentation must address the following queries:

- WHAT? What is the evidence?
- HOW? How was it collected and stored?
- WHO? Who took possession of it?
- WHEN? When was it collected/transferred/handled?
- WHERE? Where did the evidence travel?
- WHY? Why the evidence was transferred?

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uspe	ct:					
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NIST Template for CoC (2012)

Research Questions


- **RQ1:** What are the essential **security** and **operational** requirements for a digital evidence Chain of Custody?
- **RQ2**: What are the **existing frameworks** for Chain of Custody, as proposed in the academic literature and implemented in practice?
- RQ3: What evaluative criteria should be employed to assess the quality of a digital evidence Chain of Custody framework?

Methodology


(1) Literature Review

Scientific Literature Review IEEE *Xplore*® **Grey Literature Review Blog Posts News Articles** Product Guidelines and **Documentation Reports**

(2) Analysis and Modeling



(3) Assessment



Research Outcomes

RQ1: Requirements \rightarrow **RQ2:** Practices \rightarrow **RQ3:** Quality Assessment

Security Requirements

- Comprehensiveness
- Completeness
- Security and Access Control
- Immutability
- Authentication and Non-repudiation
- Verifiability

- Usability and Applicability
- Complexity and Learnability
- Resource Needs (Computational and Non-Computational)
- Direct and Indirect Costs and Liability

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
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Chain of Custody Practices

We explore various CoC practices both from academic literature and real-world digital forensics applications

We categorize them into three distinct categories:

- Traditional Paper Trail CoC
- System-oriented CoC
- Infrastructure-driven CoC



Taxonomy of CoC Practices in Digital Forensics

Traditional Paper Trail Chain of Custody

- Paper forms to chronologically record every individual who handles the evidence and track its movement
- Offers a clear and traceable record of evidence interaction with accountability by requiring signatures from authorized personnels
- Simple, straightforward, transparent, and usable in resource-constrained environments

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NIST Template for CoC (2012)

-CUSTODY TRACKING FORM

System-oriented Chain of Custody

- Systems that automate evidence tracking with metadata and digital signatures
- CoC-centric Systems vs. Systems with integrated CoCs
- Manual labour significantly reduced with the aid of automated evidence tracking and logging

Infrastructure-driven Chain of Custody

- Leveraging advanced technologies like
 Cloud Computing, Blockchain, and IoT for
 CoC and Digital Forensics ecosystem
- Distributed and Decentralized infrastructures to support more real-world forensic workflows
- Infrastructure outsourced vs. insourced
- Underlying infrastructure ensures immutability, transparency, and cryptographic security







Chain of Custody Quality Assessment

Documentation

- Manual Inputs
- Data Redundancy

Legal Credibility

- Immutability
- Transparency
- Accountability
- Verifiability

Applicability

- Complexity
- Learnability
- Usability
- Cost

• Resource Requirements

- Non-Computational
- Computational

Criteria	Sub-criteria	Paper	System	Infra.
(C_1)	Manual Inputs Data Redundancy	High Low	Medium Medium	Low High
(C_2)	Immutability Transparency Accountability Verifiability	Medium Low Low Low	Medium Medium High Low	High High High High
(C_3)	Complexity Learnability Usability Cost	Low High High Low	High Medium Medium Medium	High Low Medium High
(C_4)	Non-Computational Computational	High Low	Low Medium	Low High

 (C_1) Documentation, (C_2) Legal Credibility, (C_3) Applicability,

 (C_4) Resource Requirements

Qualitative Comparison of the CoC Practices

Key Findings

- Paper Trail is easy-to-use but might not be the most secure option
 - Straightforward approach integrates well with existing ecosystem
 - Highly practical due to simplicity, familiarity, and cost-effectiveness
 - Provides limited security, but highly adaptable
- Infrastructure-driven CoCs are secure, but confined to academic research
 - Underlying infrastructure meets the security requirements
 - Highly resource-intensive and lacks standardized practical implementation
- System-oriented CoCs find a middle ground, but still limited in application
 - Somewhat practical and adaptable, but still relies on manual obligation for compliance
 - Limited real-world application needs further investigation

Research Direction

Exploration of Tailored and Optimized Systems

- Need for Bespoke, optimized systems and infrastructures for practical and secure CoC
- Careful selection of capabilities to remove unnecessary features and functionalities that add overhead without contributing to the core objectives of CoC

Actor-centric Design and Evaluation

- Actor-centric analysis during both the design and evaluation phases
- Directly eliciting requirements from a diverse range of stakeholders to meet the varied needs and preferences of their end users

Context-aware Chain of Custody

- Incorporating contextual data to improve the traceability of evidence
- Integration of AI to streamline anomaly detection and prevent tampering in real-time
- Explore computational demands and privacy and legal concerns

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Thank you

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